Joseph C. George, State Bar No. 119231 1 Joseph C. George, Jr., State Bar No. 200999 ENDORSED Maricar A. Pascual, State Bar No. 313310 FLED ALAMEDA COUNTY LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH C. GEORGE, PH.D. A Professional Corporation 3 601 University Avenue, Suite 270 Sacramento, California 95825 Telephone: 916.641.7300 OCT 2 9 2019 CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT Facsimile: 916.641.7303 5 MANGARETI. DOMNE jcg@psyclaw.com б Attorneys for Plaintiffs DAVID DUENAS and 7 **CHARLES OTT** 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 10 Case Number: RG 19041044 11 DAVID DUENAS and CHARLES OTT, 12 Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 13 1. Negligent Supervision and/or Retention of An Employee 14 DOE 1, a corporation sole, and DOES 2 through 12, inclusive, 2. Negligent Supervision of Plaintiffs, minors 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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- 1. Plaintiff DAVID DUENAS (hereinafter "DAVID") is a natural person who was a resident of the County of Alameda, State of California, at all relevant times mentioned herein. Plaintiff DAVID's year of birth is 1964. Plaintiff DAVID was 7 years old when he was first sexually abused by Father Donald Broderson in or around 1971.
- 2. Plaintiff CHARLES OTT (hereinafter "CHARLES") is a natural person who was a resident of the County of Alameda, State of California, at all relevant times mentioned herein. Plaintiff CHARLES's year of birth is 1962. Plaintiff CHARLES was 10 years old when he was first sexually abused by Father Donald Broderson in or around 1972.
- 3. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, is a religious institution organized under the laws of the State of California as a corporation sole with its principle place of business in Oakland, California. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, is responsible for the funding, staffing and direction of the parishes, parochial schools, fraternal organizations and other facilities and institutions within the geographic area of the county of Alameda, and also encompasses Contra Costa County in northern California.
- 4. Father Donald Broderson (hereinafter "ABUSER") was an adult male who was ordained as a Catholic priest in 1968. At all times material hereto, ABUSER was under the direct supervision, employ and control of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole. ABUSER physically perpetrated acts of sexual abuse upon Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES when Plaintiffs were minors.
- 5. Father Donald Broderson served at Santa Paula in Fremont, California (5/16/68 5/15/71), St. Philip Neri in Alameda California (5/15/71 2/14/72), St. Joachim in Hayward, California (2/15/72 2/15/73) Most Precious Blood in Concord, California (2/16/73 6/14/75), St. Leonard in Fremont, California (6/15/75 1979), St. Raymond in Dublin, California (1979 1982), and Transfiguration Church in Castro Valley, California (1982 -1987).
- 6. Father Donald Broderson (hereinafter "ABUSER") was an adult male who was a priest employed by and/or working on behalf of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole. At all times material hereto, ABUSER was under the direct supervision, employ and control of Defendant DOE

1, a corporation sole. ABUSER physically perpetrated acts of childhood sexual abuse upon Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES when Plaintiffs were minors.

- 7. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of DOES 2 through 12 are unknown to Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, who therefore sue said DOE Defendants by such fictitious names. When the true names and capacities of said DOE Defendants have been ascertained, Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES will seek leave of court to amend this Complaint to allege such true names and capacities. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES are informed and believe and based thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated as a DOE herein are liable in some manner for the acts, occurrences and omissions hereinafter alleged.
- 8. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES are informed and believe and based thereon allege that at all times material hereto each Defendant was the agent, servant, employee and/or representative of each remaining Defendant, and was at all times acting within the course and scope of said agency, service, employment and/or representation. Unless otherwise indicated, each Defendant is sued as the agent, servant, employee and/or representative of each other Defendant. Each Defendant did the acts herein alleged with the permission and consent of each other Defendants. Defendants ratified, authorized, affirmed, adopted, and concealed each act or omission of each other Defendant acting as an agent, servant, employee and/or representative.
- 9. At all relevant times alleged here in Plaintiff DAVID was enrolled in and a parishioner at St. Philip Neri school and church in Alameda, California, which is owned, administered, operated, controlled, authorized by and staffed by, among others, employees of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole.
- 10. At all relevant times alleged herein, as a student at St. Philip Neri School, and as a result of Plaintiff DAVID's status as a minor, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole owed a duty of care to Plaintiff DAVID. In addition, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole had a special relationship with Plaintiff DAVID, who was a minor attending St. Philip Neri school. As a result, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole had an affirmative duty to take all reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff DAVID, who was a minor attending St. Philip Neri school. Each of Plaintiff's parents

and/or legal guardians expected Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole would provide a safe and supervised environment for Plaintiff DAVID, who was a minor attending St. Philip Neri school.

- 11. At all relevant times alleged herein Plaintiff CHARLES was a parishioner at St. Joachim's in Hayward, California, which is owned, administered, operated, controlled, authorized by and staffed by, among others, employees of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole.
- 12. As minors, Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, attended mass and engaged in confession with priests employed by Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole. Accordingly, a special relationship was formed between Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES (then minors) and Defendants. As delineated in California Evidence Code sections 1030-1034, codifying the clergyman-penitent privilege, the fact that a special relationship between Defendants and parishioners not only exists, but extends to non-spiritual matters.
- 13. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES were minors under the custody and control of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, who had control over Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES's welfare and who were responsible for running the parishes with a duty to protect Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES because they were in a special relationship with Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12. While a priest/parishioner relationship does not mean it is special per se, it does not follow that a fiduciary or confidential relationship between a priest and parishioner cannot be created on the circumstances.
- 14. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES were raised in devoutly religious families, were baptized and confirmed and regularly celebrated weekly mass and received the sacraments through their Church. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES were educated and taught the theology and tenets of The Roman Catholic Church on matters of faith, morals and religious doctrine. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES therefore developed great admiration, trust, reverence and respect for, and obedience to, Roman Catholic clergy, who occupied positions of great influence and persuasion as holy men and authority figures. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES were encouraged to trust, respect and obey ABUSER.
 - 15. Plaintiff DAVID first met and came to know ABUSER as his parish priest while

attending St. Philip Neri church and school in Alameda, California.

- 16. A major source of funds for Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole is monies received from its parishioners in the form of tithing. Another major source of funding for Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole and its agents is in the form of tuition for attendance at its Catholic schools. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole benefitted from Plaintiff DAVID and his parents through tithing and tuition.
- 17. From approximately 1971 1974, ABUSER sexually abused Plaintiff DAVID in the St. Philip Neri rectory and in Plaintiff DAVID's home.
- 18. Plaintiff CHARLES first met and came to know ABUSER as his parish priest while attending St. Joachim's in Hayward, California. Plaintiff CHARLES joined the Life Youth Program at St. Joachim's, which was overseen by ABUSER.
- 19. A major source of funds for Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole is monies received from its parishioners in the form of tithing. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole benefitted from Plaintiff CHARLES and his parents through tithing.
- 20. From approximately 1972 1973, ABUSER sexually abused Plaintiff CHARLES at a drive-in movie theater, the church rectory and a private residence.
- 21. By placing ABUSER and/or allowing him to remain in his position and function as parish priest, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, affirmatively represented to minor children and their families at St. Philip Neri and St. Joachim's, including Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, and their families, that ABUSER did not have a history of committing acts of misconduct that created a risk for childhood sexual abuse or sexually abusing children and that he was not danger to children, and that Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, had no information to the contrary.
- 22. Because Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, was in a position of superiority and influence over them, Plaintiff DAVID, Plaintiff CHARLES, and their parents believed and relied on these misrepresentations.
- 23. In reliance on the Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole's misrepresentations, ABUSER was able to gain unsupervised access to Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES

and to sexually abuse them in ABUSER's living quarters at the rectory in St. Philip Neri Church and School and St. Joachim's.

- 24. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES had no reason to suspect that they had been defrauded before that time. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES had no reason to entertain the idea that Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 would place children in harm's way by concealing their knowledge that known abusers/priests/employees were child molesters and representing that said priests should be trusted and have unsupervised access to minor parishioners.
- 25. While religious belief is absolutely protected, conduct is not protected and the actions hereinbelow alleged were illegal secular motivated conduct that is regulated by the law.
- 26. In 1962, the Vatican in Rome issued a Papal Instruction binding upon all Bishops throughout the world including the Bishop of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole. The instruction was binding upon the Bishop of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole until 2001. The instruction directed that allegations and reports of sexual abuse of children by priests were required to be kept secret and not disclosed either to civil authorities such as law enforcement, to coemployees or supervisors of parish priests, or to parishioners generally.
- 27. Canon law requires Bishops to keep subsecreto files also known as confidential files. These files are not to be made public.
- 28. Because of problems of sexual misconduct of Catholic clergy, the Catholic Church and other organizations sponsored treatment centers for priests that had been involved in sexual misconduct. One of the treatment centers that existed prior to 1982 was in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and sponsored by the servants of the Paracletes. Another treatment center for priests who engaged in sexual misconduct was St. Luke's in Suitland, Maryland.
- 29. Sexual abuse of clerics by Catholic clergy has been a reality in the Catholic Church for centuries but has remained covered by deep secrecy. This secrecy is rooted in the official policies of the Catholic Church which are applicable to all dioceses and in fact are part of the practices of each diocese, including Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole. Sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy and religious leaders became publicly known in the mid 1980's as a result of

media coverage of a case in Lafayette, Louisiana. Since that time the media has continued to expose cases of clergy sexual abuse throughout the United States. In spite of these revelations as well as the many criminal and civil litigations the Church has been involved in as a result of clergy sexual abuse of minors, the bishops and other Church leaders continued to pursue a policy of secrecy.

- 30. All of the procedures required in the so-called "Dallas Charter" have been previously mandated in the <u>Code of Canon Law</u> and in the 1922 and 1962 documents but were consistently ignored by Catholic bishops. In place of the required processes, which would have kept a written record of cases of clergy sexual abuse, the bishops applied a policy of clandestine transfer of accused priests from one local or diocesan assignment to another or from one diocese to another. The receiving parishioners and often the receiving pastors were not informed of any accusations of sexual abuse of minors.
- 31. Refusal to disclose sexually abusing clerics to parishioners and even fellow clerics has been one way utilized by Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole to maintain secrecy. Another has been to use various forms of persuasion on victims or their families to convince them to remain silent about incidents of abuse. These forms of persuasion have included methods that have ranged from sympathetic attempts to gain silence to direct intimidation to various kinds of threats. In doing so, the clergy involved, from bishops to priests, have relied on their power to overwhelm victims and their families.
- 32. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 are estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 knowing false representations as set forth below prevent them from being able to use any statute of limitations to protect themselves. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 were aware of the true facts when misrepresentations were made. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12, in effect, ratified Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole's employee's (ABUSER) conduct by failing to report him to law enforcement authorities, failing to notify police, Child Protective Services, prosecutors, parishioners and the laity. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through

12 intended that its representations would be acted upon by Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES relied on Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12's conduct to their detriment. Had Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, and their parents known what Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 knew – that ABUSER was known by Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, to be a pedophile, Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES would not have been sexually abused by ABUSER.

- 33. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 are also estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, because starting in or around 1975, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 engaged in a pattern of conduct designed to minimize the liabilities of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 because of ABUSER's conduct. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 knew ABUSER had an extensive history of sexually abusing Catholic minors while he was serving as a priest at St. Philip Neri church and school and St. Joachim's. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 engaged in conduct which precludes it from asserting a statute of limitations defense because it includes aiding and abetting ABUSER's criminal conduct in continuing to place him in work around children despite knowledge of his misconduct that created a risk of childhood sexual abuse.
- 34. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 are further estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because, as with other Roman Catholic institutions, it has systematically for many years thwarted investigations of pedophile priests, while simultaneously attempting to pacify their victims and families through use of church loyalty. This has routinely included steering victims of abuse and their families to counselors loyal to the church, while at the same time failing to inform those victims and their families that they have legal rights and that there are statutes of limitations that could preclude later bringing an action. When such victims unknowingly wait until their limitations have expired, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendant DOES 2 through 12 and other Roman Catholic entities have

- 42. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 breached their duty of care.
- 43. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 by and through their agents, servants and employees, knew or had reason to know of ABUSER's misconduct that created a risk of childhood sexual abuse and/or that ABUSER was a dangerous and unfit agent. Despite such knowledge, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 negligently supervised and/or retained ABUSER in positions of trust and authority as a priest. ABUSER therefore was able to commit harmful and wrongful acts, including acts of childhood sexual abuse, upon Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 failed to take reasonable steps and failed to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual abuse in the future by ABUSER, including but not limited to preventing or avoiding placement of ABUSER in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent aspect of that function or environment.
- 44. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12's breach was a substantial factor in ABUSER's childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES.
- 45. As a direct, legal, and proximate cause of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12's conduct/misconduct and negligence, ABUSER committed acts of childhood sexual abuse against Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES.
- 46. As a result of the conduct herein alleged, Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES suffered economic, physical, psychological and emotional harm as more fully set forth below.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Negligent Supervision of Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, minors (Against Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12)

47. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES reallege and incorporate by reference the First Cause of Action as if said allegations were fully set forth herein and with the same force and effect.

- 48. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES's Second Cause of Action is an alternative additional theory of liability as alleged against Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12.
- 49. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 are liable for the acts and omissions of their employees, including ABUSER, acting within the course and scope of his employment. At all times herein, Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 employees, including ABUSER, were acting within the course and scope of their employment.
- 50. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 had a duty to provide supervision of Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, minors, and to use reasonable care in supervising Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, minors when Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, minors, were involved in activities sponsored, supervised, organized, or directed by Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12, or their agents and employees.
- 51. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 breached their duty of care.
- 52. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12 negligently failed to supervise Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, minors, and failed to use reasonable care in protecting Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, minors, from ABUSER's misconduct that created a risk of childhood sexual abuse, while Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES, minors, were involved in activities sponsored, supervised, organized, or directed by Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12, or their agents and employees.
- 53. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12's breach was a substantial factor in ABUSER's childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES.

- 54. As a direct, legal, and proximate cause of Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12's conduct/misconduct and negligence, ABUSER committed acts of childhood sexual abuse against Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES.
- 55. As a result of the conduct herein alleged, Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES suffered economic, physical, psychological and emotional harm as more fully set forth below.

DAMAGES

- 56. As a direct, legal, and proximate result of the above Causes of Action hereinabove alleged, Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES have been damaged as set forth below.
- 57. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES have suffered psychological and emotional injury and harm, all to Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES's general damages in a sum to be proven. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES have further suffered an exacerbation of any emotional difficulties which were pre-existing Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and Defendants DOES 2 through 12's failure to protect Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES.
- 58. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES have suffered physical, mental and emotional health problems as a result of which she has had to employ, and will in the future continue to have to employ, medical and mental health professionals for diagnosis and treatment and has incurred and will in the future continue to incur expenses therefore, in a sum as yet unascertained. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES will ask leave of Court to amend this Complaint to state the exact amounts of expenses when they are ascertained.
- 59. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES have been significantly traumatized and have suffered and continue to suffer extreme mental, emotional and physical injuries to their health and well-being. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES have suffered extreme mental anguish and have been permanently scarred in a sum as yet unascertained. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES will ask leave of Court to amend this Complaint to state the exact amounts of expenses when they are ascertained.
- 60. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES will in the future suffer, or have already suffered, a loss of earnings and of earning capacity, in a sum as yet unascertained. Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES will ask leave of Court to amend this Complaint to state the exact

1	amounts of losses when they are ascertained.	
2	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff DAVID and Plaintiff CHARLES pray for judgment as	
3	follows:	
4	1.	For damages for past and future medical, psychotherapy, and related expenses
5	according to proof at the time of trial;	
6	2.	For general damages for physical and mental pain and suffering and emotional
7	distress in a sum to be proven at the time of trial;	
8	3.	For damages for future lost wages and loss of earning capacity and/or past loss
9	wages and/or past earning capacity according to proof at the time of trial;	
10	4.	For prejudgment interest pursuant to statute;
11	5.	For treble damages against Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, and/or
12	Defendants DOES 2 through 12, as authorized by section 340.1 of the Code of Civil	
13	Procedure;	
14	6.	For costs of suit herein; and
15	7.	For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.
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18	Dated: Octob	er <u>25</u> , 2019 LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH C. GEORGE, Ph.D.
19		
20		By:
21		Joseph George Attorney for Plaintiffs
22		DAVID DUENAS and CHARLES OTT
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